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Unraveling the nature of autism:
finding order amid change
Annika Hellendoorn*, Lex Wijnroks and Paul P. M. Leseman
Department of Special Education, Centre for Cognitive and Motor Disabilities, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
In this article, we hypothesize that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are
born with a deficit in invariance detection, which is a learning process whereby people
and animals come to attend the relatively stable patterns or structural regularities in the
changing stimulus array. This paper synthesizes a substantial body of research which
suggests that a deficit in the domain-general perceptual learning process of invariant
detection in ASD can lead to a cascade of consequences in different developmental
domains. We will outline how this deficit in invariant detection can cause uncertainty,
unpredictability, and a lack of control for individuals with ASD and how varying degrees
of impairments in this learning process can account for the heterogeneity of the ASD
phenotype. We also describe how differences in neural plasticity in ASD underlie the
impairments in perceptual learning. The present account offers an alternative to prior
theories and contributes to the challenge of understanding the developmental trajectories
that result in the variety of autistic behaviors.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, invariance detection, perceptual learning, embodied cognition, neural
plasticity
“The art of progress is to preserve order amid change, and to preserve change amid order.”
(Whitehead, 1929, p. 339)
After decades of intensive research in the field of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), it is still unclear
what causes this disorder and how this disorder emerges. Although several theories have been
proposed to explain ASD, current approaches are not able to account for the myriad of symptoms
and heterogeneity present in ASD. The three most influential cognitive theories (Rajendran and
Mitchell, 2007) that have been proposed are the Theory of Mind (ToM; theory; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985), the Executive Dysfunction hypothesis (Ozonoff et al., 1991), and the Weak Central
Coherence (WCC) account (Frith and Happé, 1994; Happé and Frith, 2006). The first two theories
attribute the symptoms of ASD to a deficit in an internal cognitive structure or module, while
the latter explains ASD by a detail-focused processing style. According to these theories, learning
is a top-down cognitive process and the construction of meaning is located in the mind of an
individual. Even the WCC account, which has contributed to a shift toward perceptual processes
in ASD, considers perception as a top-down cognitive process (De Jaegher, 2013). Although these
approaches have contributed significantly to the understanding of ASD, they are less able to account
for the fact that ASD is a pervasive developmental disorder (Mottron et al., 2006; Rajendran and
Mitchell, 2007). That is, they have difficulties to explain both the social and non-social symptoms
and their explanations do not start from a developmental perspective, but are rather limited to a
static impairment (Rajendran and Mitchell, 2007; López, 2013). A developmental approach that
suggests a deficit in a domain-general learning process instead of a static module might extend
our understanding of how the ASD phenotype emerges in the first years of life and develops
over time. Our theoretical approach to ASD is grounded in Gibson’s perception-action theory
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(Gibson, 1979/1986; Gibson and Pick, 2000), the theoretical
framework of embodied embedded cognition (Varela et al., 1991;
Smith, 2005; Smith and Gasser, 2005; Barrett, 2011), and the
neural mechanisms of pruning and synchronization (Uhlhaas
and Singer, 2006; Hyde et al., 2010; Friston, 2011; Miller and
Buschman, 2013). Our central hypothesis is that children with
ASD are born with a deficit in detecting invariant structures and
that differences in the ability to detect invariantsmight explain the
heterogeneity in the ASD phenotype.
Invariance detection means selective attention to the relatively
stable patterns or structural regularities in the changing stimulus
array (Gibson and Pick, 2000; Gogate and Hollich, 2010). Invari-
ance detection helps people to perceive and experience order in
their surrounding world which has changing and invariant prop-
erties. An example of such an invariant is constancy of size. This
means that an object’s size does not vary as the observer’s viewing
distance or viewing angle changes. Actions of people also contain
invariant spatiotemporal properties. These invariants differentiate
a specific action from other actions. A walking movement, for
instance, is specified by a specific spatial configuration of a human
form in a specific pattern of change over time. Invariants can be
divided in structural and transformational invariants (Michaels
and Carello, 1981; Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008). Elements that
remain the same over change are referred to as structural invari-
ants. For example, the shape of an object remains the same as it
rotates. Transformational invariants are structures that specify the
change in an object or person over time. This is also referred to
as change constancy (Michaels and Carello, 1981). The bouncing
of the ball and the walking movement of a person are examples
of transformational invariants. Despite enormous variation, the
movements of bouncing and walking are easily recognized (Kim
et al., 1995).
The invariant structure in the environment is intelligible as
offering an agent a certain type of interaction (Gangopadhyay and
Schilbach, 2012). In other words, the invariant structure specifies
the action possibilities in the environment. These possibilities
are referred to as affordances (Gibson, 1979/1986; Gibson and
Pick, 2000). It is expected that difficulties in invariance detection
in ASD result in being slower and less able in perceiving the
affordances of the environment. In contrast to the aforementioned
ASD theories, this is not considered a top-down cognitive pro-
cess that locates the construction of meaning in the mind of
an individual in the form of internal representations acquired
by detached passive observation. Rather, detecting invariance
and affordances is considered an embodied embedded learning
process that can only emerge from the active interaction of an
agent with its environment. Cognition cannot be separated from
perception and action; it emerges from, is embedded in, and
may be equated with perception-action processes (Smith and
Gasser, 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Smith and Sheya,
2010).
The very basic perceptual learning process of invariance and
affordance detection, which we share with animals (Hauser et al.,
2001; Barrett, 2011; Wood, 2013), is already present at birth
(Gibson and Pick, 2000; Teinonen et al., 2009). This process is
the fundamental starting point for infants to perceive order, to
understand and act upon their highly complex physical and social
environment of objects, events and persons (Gibson and Pick,
2000; Fiser and Aslin, 2001, 2002a,b, 2005; Gómez, 2002; Gogate
and Hollich, 2010; Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012). The per-
ception of invariants reduces uncertainty. A general purpose of
most organisms is to make the environment as predictable as
possible, because when one needs only to attend to information
in the environment that is unexpected, one does not have to
waste energy (Friston, 2011; Hohwy, 2012; Clark, 2013). This is
an economical principle in which energy is only used for attend-
ing to events that are unexpected. This means that if nothing is
expected, because one is not able to detect invariants, all incom-
ing information is attended to and in turn this easily will lead
to a sensory overload and feelings of being overwhelmed and
exhausted (Pellicano, 2013). Detecting invariants reduces uncer-
tainty, makes the environment more predictable and will increase
feelings of security. Moreover, infants will experience that their
actions can lead to predictable outcomes. As a result they will
develop expectations about the predictability and controllability
of their actions and experiences, hence a sense of control (Gibson
and Pick, 2000).
Invariance detection at a more basic level serves as a building
block for invariance detection at more complex levels (Gogate
and Hollich, 2010). Through active engagement with the envi-
ronment in continuous perception-action cycles children will be
able to detect ever more complex affordances eventually, which
is comparable to the way experts are able to perceive affordances
unavailable to novices (Gibson and Pick, 2000). Central to our
hypothesis is that we propose that from birth on infants with ASD
experience difficulties in detecting invariants and as a result the
core symptoms of ASDwill gradually emerge.We propose that the
core symptoms of ASD emerge after many experiences with the
environment duringwhich even simple invariants and affordances
may not be detected or very slowly. The detection of lower- order
invariants serves as a building block for the detection of higher-
order invariants and affordances (Warren and Shaw, 1985; Best,
1995; Wells, 2002; Gogate and Hollich, 2010). Additionally, the
perception of invariance at a basic level provides order, structure
and a sense of control. This is a premise for further exploration,
which facilitates the detection of other invariants and affordances.
On the contrary, when the world is perceived as largely unpre-
dictable and chaotic as a result of not being able to detect even
simple invariants, this will hinder exploration and thereby the
detection of other invariants and affordances.
As outlined above, a deficit or delay in invariance and affor-
dance detection at birth in ASD, may lead to a cascade of con-
sequences. Our hypothesis suggests that it will lead to various
degrees of impairments in every developmental domain, from
sensorimotor development to language and social development.
This hypothesis may explain the wide variety of ASD impairments
in different developmental domains instead of being limited to
only on a subset of behaviors. Moreover, we suggest that the
severity of autistic symptoms is determined by the degree of
impairment of this particular learning process. That is, the lesswell
the process is functioning, the more severe the symptoms will be
and vice versa.
In the present paper, we will first discuss a range of empiri-
cal studies pertaining to several developmental domains that are
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in accordance with our hypothesis. Then, some specific neural
mechanisms that are in line with our hypothesis are discussed.
Thirdly, we will explain how developmental cascades may play a
role in the development of ASD.Wewill also address the spectrum
nature of autism. Finally, research designs for future research
and the possible clinical implications of our hypothesis will be
discussed.
Motor Functioning and Imitation
Although not considered a core symptom of ASD many children
and adults with ASD display delays and impairments in motor
functioning, including delays in motor milestones, atypicalities in
motor coordination, postural control, anticipation, planning and
symmetry of movements (Fournier et al., 2010; Staples and Reid,
2010; Bhat et al., 2011; Forti et al., 2011; Brisson et al., 2012). We
hypothesize that part of these motor problems may be explained
by difficulties in the perception of invariants. Actions can be speci-
fied by an invariant structure combined with variant features. The
invariant structure of a movement remains essentially the same
while other features are changing, for instance when adjusting to
a changing environment (Schmidt andWrisberg, 2008). Research
shows that invariant patterns are inherent in our everyday actions
(Baldwin et al., 2008), such as toothbrushing (Reed et al., 1995)
and locomotion (Das and McCollum, 1988; Funato et al., 2010).
Reed et al. (1995) explain: “What remains invariant in performing
a task from time to time and place to place is not the sequence of
units, nor even all the particular units, but rather a higher order
relationship among units.” (p. 44). Invariants characterize the total
movement.A reachingmovement, for instance, is characterized by
an armmoving away from the body, approaching the object closer
and closer, and closing in as it begins tomake contact (Gibson and
Pick, 2000, p. 134). The process of learning a specific motor skill
is associated with a reduction in trajectory irregularity (Shmuelof
et al., 2012). Being attuned to the invariant structure is necessary
to predict and anticipate an action (Gibson and Pick, 2000).
Research shows that children with ASD do not make antici-
patory postural adjustments in a bimanual lifting task and in a
feeding situation, which indicates the use of a feedback rather
than a feedforward mode of control (Schmitz et al., 2003; Brisson
et al., 2012). The use of a feedforward mode of control requires
detecting the invariant structure of the action. A deficit in the
detection of the invariant structure of the total movement may
also explain why children with ASD have difficulties in chaining
motor acts into a global action (Cattaneo et al., 2007; Gordon and
Stark, 2007; Gidley Larson and Mostofsky, 2008; Fabbri-Destro
et al., 2009). Children with ASD also often imitate a movement
only partially and need more attempts to imitate the whole action
(Vanvuchelen et al., 2007, for a review, on imitation in autism see
Vanvuchelen et al., 2013). These findings are also consistent with
research that indicates that children with ASD require additional
demonstration and practice to learn how to retrieve a gift from
a box, a task that requires a specific movement trajectory (Nadel
et al., 2011). This latter study indicates that people with ASD
are to some extent able to detect the invariant structure of an
action, but are attunedmore slowly to this structure. Other studies
support that increased exposure to an action sequence is necessary
to learn an action sequence to individuals with autism (Gordon
and Stark, 2007). This indicates that at least some individuals
with ASD are able to detect the invariant structure of an action,
but are much slower in doing this than individuals without ASD.
Consistent with the invariance detection hypothesis, childrenwith
ASD are performing better when imitating the actions of a robot
compared to human movement (Pierno et al., 2008). It is clear
that robotic movements contain less variance compared to human
actions, which are characterized by a high degree of variability
around the invariant structure (Pierno et al., 2008). Assuming
that the actions of typically developing people are guided by the
ability to pick up the invariant structure, while invariants are not
or more slowly detected by people with ASD, more and longer
lasting variability would be expected in the ASD group and less
movement variability in the typically developing people. Studies
indeed indicate that people with ASD display greater movement
variability (larger standard deviations) in a precision grip task, in
a reach-to-grasp task and in gait compared to the control group
(Mari et al., 2003; Rinehart et al., 2006; David et al., 2009).
Perception and Sensory Sensitivities
It has been reported that people with ASD display superior change
detection (Smith and Milne, 2008), reduced change blindness
(Fletcher-Watson et al., 2012), and are more successful at visual
search tasks (Kaldy et al., 2011) compared to typically developing
controls. Smith and Milne (2008) found that people with ASD
were superior in the detection of change in a film clip and this
advantage was particularly apparent for the “marginal” changes;
changes to items not highly relevant to the scene. At first site this
finding contradicts our hypothesis, but this sensitivity to change
might be explained by the difficulties people with ASD have
with detecting the invariant structure of the scene. In typically
developing individuals detection of the invariant structure of the
scene helps to ignore the perception of changes in irrelevant
items. The result of invariance detection process is the separation
between the relevant items building the invariant structure and
the irrelevant items that are not part of the invariant structure.
This may also explain the faster performance of individuals with
ASD on tasks such as the block design task scales (Shah and
Frith, 1993) and faster and more accurate performance on the
embedded figures task (EFT; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997)
compared to matched controls. Furthermore, individuals with
autism discriminate better between novel, highly similar stimuli
in a perceptual learning task than do a matched control group
(Plaisted et al., 1998). All three tasks require detection of a tar-
get between distractors and are determined by the degree of
similarity between target and distracters. Typically developing
individuals have more difficulties detecting the target, since the
target is not part of the invariant structure or pattern among
the distractors or of the larger figures in the EFT. The target
is not expected and attended to. Typically, the detection of the
invariant structure also leads to change blindness. In this way, the
discovery of invariant structure yields economy in perception. It
serves as a selection mechanism (Gibson and Pick, 2000). Inter-
estingly, Fletcher-Watson et al. (2012) did find reduced change
blindness in children with ASD in complex social scenes. Other
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studies, however, did not find evidence of attenuated change
blindness using pairs of images of isolated objects in a similar
age sample (Burack et al., 2009). These contrasting findings have
been explained by the difference in using social versus non-social
information (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2012). However, this may
also be explained by the nature of social information. In a complex
social scene people with ASD may experience large difficulties in
detecting the invariant structure as such a scene hasmany features
and extracting regularities and therefore is highly complex. In
contrast, extracting the invariant structure of isolated objects is
far less demanding and most children with ASD are apparently
able to do that. Although children with ASD do show change
blindness with isolated object stimuli they do not with more
complex stimuli. This can be explained by a general deficit in the
detection of invariant structure. The idea that impaired invariant
detection plays a role in the perceptual abilities of people with
ASD is also consistent with findings regarding deficits in motion
detection in ASD (Annaz et al., 2010). In order to detect motion
one needs to be able to detect the transformational invariant.
Studies show that children with ASD are less able to perceive
biological motion than typically developing children when asked
to identify a human point-light walker from scrambled dots (Blake
et al., 2003). Identifying biological motion requires detecting both
structural invariants (e.g., human body shape) as well as transfor-
mational invariants (e.g., pattern of change that specifies human
walking).
Children with ASD have been found to orient more to non-
social stimuli than to social-biologicalmotion (Klin et al., 2003). A
possible explanation is that non-social contingencies often require
extracting regularities from fewer features, over shorter temporal
and spatial scales. Annaz et al. (2010) found that in contrast to typ-
ically developing children who demonstrated increased sensitivity
to biological motion with increasing age, no evidence of learning
took place in children with ASD over time, demonstrating more
difficulties detecting the invariant structure of biological motion
(Annaz et al., 2010).
If the detection of invariant structure is impaired in ASD, one
would also expect to find impairment in categorization and pro-
totype formation because categorization and prototype learning
requires extraction of the invariant common structure of several
instances of a category. Several studies indeed show deficits in
prototype formation and categorization, both with social and
non-social stimuli (Klinger and Dawson, 2001; Klinger et al.,
2007; Gastgeb et al., 2009, 2012; Church et al., 2010; Fields,
2012). Supporting our hypothesis of invariance detection, stimuli
with complex dimensions of similarity are expected to be more
problematic for individuals with ASD than stimuli made up of
simple binary feature combinations (Bott et al., 2005; Molesworth
et al., 2005, 2008). Many social-communicative stimuli, including
facial stimuli, gestures and prosody in language use, have these
more complex and dynamic invariant structures and therefore
will be difficult to detect for people with ASD. These expec-
tations are consistent with research that shows slowed habitua-
tion to faces in toddlers with symptoms of ASD (Webb et al.,
2010).
Several studies demonstrate sensory abnormalities in all sen-
sory modalities in children with ASD which range from hyper-
sensitivity to hyposensitivity (Pellicano, 2013; for a meta-analysis,
see Ben-Sasson et al., 2009). Our hypothesis of a deficit in invari-
ance detection may explain several of these abnormalities. Since
typically developing people are able to detect the regularities in
the environment and therefore able to predict and anticipate,
information attended to will be reduced and sensory information
will be predicted and anticipated. Because people with ASD may
have, aswe suggest, difficulties in detecting the invariant structure,
they are less able to predict and anticipate and therefore will be
more often “surprised” by for instance a noise or a touch compared
to typically developing people. Not being able to detect invariant
structures will lead to less selection and compression of informa-
tion, and reduction of irrelevant information and consequently
to regular experiences of sensory overload and strong feelings of
uncontrollability (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Pellicano, 2013). This is
also consistent with findings that people with ASD do not seem to
show these sensitivities in self-produced or self-controlled sensory
effects (Pellicano, 2013).
Repetitive and Stereotyped Behavior
Repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and
activities are a core feature of ASD (Watt et al., 2008). As already
stated before, if people with ASD are not attuned to the regu-
larities in the environment, their environment becomes rather
unpredictable and they will not achieve a sense of control. They
rather develop an aversion to variance and try to avoid change.
Repetitive and stereotyped behavior may therefore be adaptive
for people with ASD. A preference for simple invariant struc-
tures of regularities, either self-produced or perceived, might be
viewed as a strategy to seek environments and events which
are highly predictable. As a well-known ASD autobiographical
writer with ASD describes: “The constant change of most things
never gave me any chance to prepare myself for them. Because
of this I found pleasure in doing the same things over and over.”
(Williams, 1992, p. 39–40). Repetitive manipulation of objects
may provide children with ASD with feelings of security and a
sense of control of an unpredictable and highly variant environ-
ment, hence reduce feelings of anxiety or anger (Leekam et al.,
2011; Rodgers et al., 2012). Repetitive behaviors can be seen as
performatory actions that have expected results. They depend
on and confirm an already learned affordance (Gibson and Pick,
2000). Exploratory actions, in contrast, provide new and a priori
variant information. The fact that children with ASD display less
and less varied exploratory behavior compared to children with
other developmental delays and typically developing children
and (Pierce and Courchesne, 2001; Ozonoff et al., 2008; Koterba
et al., 2014; Hellendoorn et al., 2015) may well be explained by
their difficulties in detecting invariant structure in new informa-
tion. Adding new information through exploration only creates
uncertainty and is therefore avoided. Moreover, children with
autism may also be unable to demonstrate complex exploratory
behaviors, since the discovery of certain invariants and affor-
dances is required to provide the gateway for the discovery of
other, possibly higher-order, invariants and affordances (Gogate
and Hollich, 2010). A child may for instance first discover the
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characteristics of two separate objects and over time discover
that these objects can be combined (Lockman, 2000). If children
with autism are impaired in invariant detection, they may not
proceed to the level of making combinations or proceed to mak-
ing combinations much later than typically developing children.
An early study indeed did find that combinatorial use of toys
indeed differentiates children with autism from children with an
intellectual disability and typically developing children (Tilton and
Ottinger, 1964). Preference for observing spinning or rotating
movements (spinning objects, watching washing machine rotat-
ing, spinning wheels of toy cars), for instance, is common in
children with ASD (Bracha et al., 1995). A rotating movement is
characterized by invariance and predictability of visuotemporal-
spatial information. This keeps uncertainty to a minimum and
provides people with ASD with a sense of control. The fact that
people with ASD show intact or even strong systemizing (Baron-
Cohen, 2009), is consistent with our hypothesis. Systems are
characterized by clear regularities, and strict “if p, that q rules.”
The regularities in our daily environment are very different from
the regularities that make up systems. System regularities are
lawful and deterministic, while social situations are for instance
characterized by more subtle complex regularities that have to
be extracted over larger temporal and spatial scales with many
features.
Language and Communication
Invariance detection is a fundamental mechanism in acquiring
language and communication (Saffran and Wilson, 2003; Gogate
and Hollich, 2010; Romberg and Saffran, 2010). Although young
infants do not yet understand the language addressed to them,
language already develops by the detection of the phonotactic
invariants. Young infants (even before they are born) already
detect the acoustically invariant patterns (for instance the recur-
rent rhythm andmelody) that specify their native language (Kuhl,
2000; Karmiloff andKarmiloff-Smith, 2001). An importantmech-
anism, crucial for language acquisition, is the ability to identify
phonemes and phoneme clusters despite variation in speakers,
background noise, speech rate, and surrounding phonemes. Based
on detecting stress patterns and the statistical distribution patterns
of phoneme clusters, infants become able to segment the speech
stream in units corresponding with words and phrases in the
first years of life, which underlies word learning (Gómez, 2002;
Saffran and Wilson, 2003; Romberg and Saffran, 2010). On the
basis on the relative invariance in the syllabic constituents and
the syllable stress patterns of their names, infants recognize their
own names earlier than those of others (Mandel et al., 1995;
Gogate and Hollich, 2010). Invariance detection also underlies
grammar learning, which according to the construction gram-
mar approach, is based in abstracting types, or categories, from
varying tokens (Jackendoff, 2002; Tomasello, 2006). Childrenwith
ASD are indeed impaired in extracting phonetic features (Lep-
isto et al., 2008), which points to a general deficit in invariant
detection. Another study supports this hypothesis demonstrat-
ing that children with ASD are impaired in the ability to detect
transitional probabilities in language (Scott-Van Zeeland et al.,
2010). It may also be possible that some children with ASD are
able to extract the invariant structure in language, but are slower
in detecting this structure and therefore need more time and
exposure to linguistic information. This is consistent with the
study of Scott-Van Zeeland et al. (2010), who found a deficit in
implicit language learning in children with ASD listening to a
2.4 min speech stream while another study did not find a deficit
in statistical language learning in children with ASD using a
21 min speech stream (Mayo and Eigsti, 2012). It should also
be noted that both studies used high-functioning children with
ASD. It can be expected that lower functioning children with
ASD would also be impaired in extracting the invariant struc-
ture in the lengthy speech stream presented in the second study.
Since invariance detection is already present in the first months
of life (Kuhl, 2000; Teinonen et al., 2009) it can be expected
that children with ASD show delays and deficits in language
acquisition at an early age. Children with ASD indeed show
significant delays and deficits in language development early in
life. Those children with ASD who eventually acquire spoken
language speak their first words when they are 38 months old
on average (Howlin, 2003), as compared to 12–18 months in
typically developing children. No babbling by 12 months and no
functional words by 16 months are both used as so called red
flags in early screening for ASD (Dereu et al., 2010). It is also
often reported that children with ASD seem deaf, because they
do not or only poorly respond to voices and their own names
(Osterling and Dawson, 1994; Werner et al., 2000). Additionally,
deficits in syntactic and morphological skills are present in ASD
(Eigsti et al., 2007). Prosodic impairments have also been found in
ASD, characterized by inappropriate use of stress, pitch variation,
and rhythm (Shriberg et al., 2001; Paul et al., 2005). Studies
demonstrate that some language domains are more impaired than
others. Learning the meaning of abstract words classes is more
impaired in ASD than the learning of concrete word classes. This
has been demonstrated by behavioral studies and neuroscientific
studies (Toichi and Kamio, 2003; Harris et al., 2006) and can also
be attributed to a deficit in invariance detection. Learning the
meaning and correct use of abstract words and use it correctly
requires extracting the invariant over a large amount of uses of
these words in variant contexts, while learning the meaning of
single words referring to concrete objects requires less complex
invariance detection.
Obviously language learning takes place in context, with the
infant and caregiver surrounded by objects they can see and touch
while engaging in social interactions. Romberg and Saffran (2010)
conclude, for example, that language learning is most efficient
when regularities in the speech stream coincide with environmen-
tal regularities. If infants with ASD indeed have a general deficit
in invariance detection, it is expected that language acquisition in
ASD is not only negatively influenced by difficulties in detecting
invariants in speech, but also by deficits in invariance detection
in the broader context of objects, events and social interaction
which are also relevant for language acquisition (Yu and Ballard,
2007). Note that most of the reported language problems may
also be explained by social-communicative impairments, which
may also dependent on invariant detection as will be described
below.
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Social Interaction
Gibson (1979/1986) stated that the richest and most elaborate
affordances for people are provided by other people (p. 135).
Detecting the regularities or invariants in social behavior is more
difficult than detecting regularities in the physical environment
(e.g., objects), because human behavior is dynamic, variable,
context-dependent and not lawful and deterministic. This may
explain why people with ASD experience most difficulties in
the social-communicative domain, for instance with face pro-
cessing. As the eye region and the muscles in the face, used
to express emotions, are the most variant part of the faces,
they will make the detection of invariances more difficult than
recognizing objects or even moving objects and animals. This
might explain why individuals with ASD spend less time looking
at faces in general (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Clifford et al., 2007)
and actively avoid the eye-region (Klin et al., 2003; Kliemann
et al., 2012). Our hypothesis may also explains why people with
ASD prefer objects over people (Klin et al., 2003) and are better
in imitating robots than humans, (Pierno et al., 2008) because
robots move in a much more lawful and predictable way than
humans. The variability in human motion not only makes it
harder for people with ASD to detect the invariants, but will lead
to a preference for interacting with objects and robots instead
of humans. Consequently, children with ASD will have more
difficulties to correctly identify and therefore understand human
actions. Indeed, children with ASD are impaired in the ability
to recognize human gestures and actions and to respond appro-
priately to them (Dowell et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 2013).
Moreover, they are less sensitive compared to typically developing
controls in discriminating between point-light biological motion
and scrambled motion when briefly presented (Blake et al., 2003)
and less effective in discriminating between biologicalmotion and
mechanical motion (Cook et al., 2009). This account of the social
deficits in ASD is different from the traditional ToM explanation
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) in the sense that the ToM paradigm
attributes the social difficulties to a deficit in social cognition per
se, while our hypothesis states that people with ASD have prob-
lems in the social-communicative domain because of the nature
of social information, i.e., the complexity of variant–invariant
configuration (Hellendoorn, 2014). Thus, non-social informa-
tion that is equally (in) variant is expected to lead to the same
difficulties.
Neurobiological Mechanisms
Researchers have attempted to identify to neural correlates of
invariance detection in typical development. However, implicit
perceptual learning does not produce a single characteristic sig-
nature of evoked neural activity in one brain system in a single
direction (Reber, 2013). Studies demonstrate that changes in the
brain that follow perceptual learning are spread across the brain
and in different directions (for a review, see Reber, 2013). It
has been demonstrated that implicit perceptual learning is not
supported by the same specific structures that underlie explicit
learning, such as themedial temporal lobe system (Verfaellie et al.,
2013). Several studies indicate that implicit perceptual learning
is based on general neural plasticity mechanisms, i.e., processes
that modulate changes in connections over time (for a review,
see Reber, 2013). An important neural plasticity mechanism dur-
ing perceptual learning is neural synchrony (Gotts et al., 2012).
Greater neural synchrony is for instance seen when people are
repeatedly exposed to a stimulus (Ghuman et al., 2008; Gotts et al.,
2012). Repeated exposure to a stimulus facilities its processing.
With repeated exposure people become faster and more accurate
in identifying the stimulus and classifying it. This perceptual
learning process is a result of enhanced communication between
distinct cortical regions. Repeated object classification leads to
decreased neural responses in the prefrontal cortex and tempo-
ral cortex. This decrease in absolute activity is accompanied by
greater neural synchrony between these regions with repetition
(Ghuman et al., 2008). Several researchers have suggested that this
neural synchrony in the brain reflects structures in the stimulus
environment (Friston, 2011; Brette, 2012). In a heterogeneous
neural population, synchrony patterns represent structure, that is,
sensory invariants in stimuli (Friston, 2011; Brette, 2012). While
individual neural responses vary with many aspects of stimuli,
the spatial structure of synchrony is invariant (Brette, 2012). This
is consistent with the idea that the brain does not construct
information from the input, but rather resonates to the structured
information present in the environment (Gibson, 1979/1986).
Rodriguez et al. (1999) found a pattern of synchrony between
occipital, parietal and frontal areas during face recognition in
human, while it was absent when faces were not recognized. Since
face recognition is based on the perception of a global, invariant
structure (Goffaux and Rossion, 2006), the study by Rodriguez
et al. (1999) provides evidence for the idea that neural synchrony
patterns reflect invariant structure. Reduced neural synchroniza-
tion has also been associated with deficits in gestalt perception
(Uhlhaas et al., 2006). Other studies also confirm that following
experience/training, firing patterns in primary visual cortex and
in primary auditory cortex neurons change so that they reflect
the statistical, invariant structure of the frequently experienced
input patterns in a specific task (Li et al., 2004; Polley et al.,
2006). If neural synchrony is amechanism for invariance detection
then dysfunctional neural synchrony in ASD would be consistent
with the hypothesis that individuals with ASD have a deficit in
invariance detection. Indeed, several studies support the hypoth-
esis of dysfunctional neural synchronization in ASD (Uhlhaas
and Singer, 2006, 2007, 2012; Wilson et al., 2007; Sun et al.,
2012). One study, for example, demonstrated impaired prefrontal
gammaband synchrony inASDduring gaze cueing (Richard et al.,
2013). Interestingly, abnormal neural synchrony has also been
observed in other disorders that are comorbid to ASD, such as
schizophrenia and epilepsy (Uhlhaas et al., 2006; Uhlhaas and
Singer, 2006, 2012). Synchronized neural oscillations are a funda-
mental mechanism for the emergence of coordinated networks in
the brain. If these oscillatory signals are synchronized, they form
ensembles and these ensembles form larger functional networks
(Miller and Buschman, 2013). Neural synchrony also plays an
important role in the strengthening and pruning of connections
(Uhlhaas and Singer, 2011). The mechanism of dysfunctional
neural synchrony is in line with the brain connectivity theories
that suggest that in ASD long-range connections between brain
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areas are underdeveloped, while short-range connections within
brain areas are overdeveloped (Just et al., 2004; Courchesne and
Pierce, 2005a,b; for a review, see Wass, 2011). If the combination
of too many short range connections with too little long-range
connection is related to the proposed deficit in invariance detec-
tion, then it can be expected that the balance between short and
long range connections is related to ASD severity. It has indeed
been demonstrated that with increasing ASD severity, short-range
coherence is more pronounced and long-range coherence more
decreased (Barttfeld et al., 2011).
Several studies demonstrated differences between individuals
with and without ASD in neural plasticity during perceptual
learning tasks (Schipul et al., 2012; Dovgopoly andMercado, 2013;
Church et al., 2015). In a task where adults learned to categorize
dot patterns, adults with ASD showed less changes in cortical acti-
vation over time compared to typically developing adults (Schipul,
2012). A positive relationship was found between the disruption
of learning-induced changes in cortical activation and the severity
of ASD symptoms. Thus, disrupted cortical reorganization seems
to be related to impairments in—or slower perceptual learning
in individuals with ASD. Another example of a neural plasticity
mechanism that has been specifically associated with learning-
induced changes in cortical activation is repression suppression
(Ewbank et al., 2014). Typically, repetitions of the same stimulus
result in a reduction in the neural response. This process is called
repression suppression. Studies show that individual differences
in autistic traits predict repression surpression in the visual cortex
in perceptual learning tasks including both social and non-social
visual objects and including both complex and simple shapes
(Ewbank et al., 2014). The more autistic traits, the less repression
suppression. In normal development, another process that is part
of neural plasticity as a result of perceptual learning, is pruning.
Research suggests that atypical synaptic pruning might lead to
deficits in invariance detection. Studies demonstrate that when
connectivity is too high, it can lead to an impaired ability to
generalize and to efficiently select relevant information (Belmonte
and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Cohen, 2007). Thus, a deficit or delay
in pruning may be a potential mechanism in the proposed deficit
of invariant detection in ASD. Research demonstrates an excess
in synapses in children with ASD, which is consistent with a
deficit or delay in synaptic pruning (Hardan et al., 2006; Hyde
et al., 2010). Cortical thickness has been hypothesized to reflect
pruning. Especially at a younger age children with ASD have
increased cortical thickness compared to typically developing
children (Hardan et al., 2006). Increased cortical thickness in
ASD has been demonstrated in the primary visual and auditory
cortex (Hyde et al., 2010; Nebel et al., 2014). Consistent with these
results, several other studies have found increased head circum-
ference and brain enlargement in ASD, which is also especially
apparent in the first years of life (Courchesne et al., 2003; Redcay
and Courchesne, 2005; Vaccarino and Smith, 2009; Schumann
et al., 2010). In particular early maturing brain areas, such as
the sensory and motor brain areas are under stronger genetic
influence. Several researchers have suggested that differences in
pruning in ASD may be partly caused by genetic differences,
such as microdeletion syndromes (Fahim et al., 2012; Persico and
Napolioni, 2013). An increased head circumference has also been
reported for infant siblings of children with ASD (Constantino
et al., 2010).
Recently, using Bayesian models, several authors have sug-
gested that the brain implicitly generates hypotheses based on
prior knowledge (Friston, 2011; Brown and Brüne, 2012; Clark,
2013). These priors are based on the detected invariant structure
in the environment (Brown and Brüne, 2012; Pellicano, 2013). If
priors are based on invariants in the environment and people with
ASD have a deficit in invariance detection, then it can be expected
that they fail to generate expectations or have priors that are not
accurate (Pellicano and Burr, 2012). As a result it can be expected
that people with ASD are more often than other people in a state
of surprise, experiencing the world as unpredictable (Gomot and
Wicker, 2012). This alsomay explainwhy people with ASD engage
in behavior thatminimizes change and seek for input that is highly
predictable. It is consistent with the reported feelings of sensory
overload in people with ASD, because the implicit model also acts
as a filtering mechanism (Pellicano, 2013).
In contrast to cognitivist neuroscience, current embodied cog-
nition approaches consider internal states (resonating invariant
structure in the environment) not as representations, but rather
as “action-oriented pointers” or “sensorimotor activity patterns”
(Engel et al., 2001; Clark, 2013). This is consistent with the
aforementioned idea that invariant structures in the environment
specify affordances. Thus, people with ASD do not perceive the
same affordances as other people because of their deficit in invari-
ant detection. Recent neuroscientific findings suggest that the
brain is making action-oriented predictions specified by invariant
structures (Friston, 2011; Clark, 2013). Research with monkeys,
for example, shows that the brain directly codes the external world
in terms of action possibilities by canonical neurons that fire when
the monkey observes an object and mirror neurons that fire when
the monkey observes another monkey or human being perform a
goal directed action (Gallese, 2007; for a review, see Rizolatti and
Craighero, 2004). The canonical and mirror neuron system may
be an example of a system that consists of synchronized oscilla-
tions reflecting the invariant structure of objects and actions of
people and then specifies affordances directly. Although evidence
on mirror neurons in humans is still scarce (for a review, see
Hamilton, 2013), some studies with brain imaging techniques,
indicate the existence of both canonical and mirror neuron sys-
tems in humans (Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Kilner et al., 2009).
Some studies have suggested that children with ASD have an
impairment in the mirror neuron mechanism (Dapretto et al.,
2006), which is also known as the “broken mirror” hypothesis
(Oberman et al., 2008). Other studies suggest that that mirror
neuron system may not be broken down but just more slowly
developing in ASD (Bastiaansen et al., 2011). The functioning of
the mirror neuron system is dependent on the communication
between brain areas (Kilner et al., 2009), therefore the proposed
mechanism of impaired neural synchrony in ASDmay also impair
the mirror neuron network.
Developmental Cascades Across Domains
In studying ASD and other developmental disorders, it is impor-
tant not to rely on phenotypic outcomes to draw conclusions about
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impaired or intact modules in the initial state, but rather to take a
developmental approach and examine the course of the disorder
over time, including the role of developmental cascades across
domains (Paterson et al., 1999; Masten and Cicchetti, 2010). The
present paper suggests that a deficit in invariant detection in ASD
is already present at birth and it will have a great impact on the
child’s development because invariant detection develops from
detecting few and lower order invariants to the ability to detect
more and more complex higher order invariants and affordances.
Not only is invariance detection a core mechanism of learning
and development that affects all developmental domains, it is
also expected that development in one domain will influence
the development in other domains (Paterson et al., 1999; Mas-
ten and Cicchetti, 2010). This is consistent with an embodied
cognition perspective and a dynamic systems approach to devel-
opment, which considers behavior as the emergent pattern of
multiple interacting and cooperating components (Thelen, 2008).
Several examples of plausible developmental cascades have been
described in typically developing children, such as relationships
between motor functioning, exploration, spatial cognition, per-
ception, social interaction and language development (Campos
et al., 2000; Clearfield et al., 2008; Iverson, 2010; Soska et al., 2010;
Clearfield, 2011; Oudgenoeg-Paz et al., 2012; Smith, 2013;Wellsby
and Pexman, 2014). These developmental cascades should also be
considered when studying the development of ASD symptoma-
tology. Indeed, several studies have suggested and demonstrated
interrelationships between developmental domains in ASD, for
instance between motor imitation and language development
(Stone and Yoder, 2001), exploration and language (Hellendoorn
et al., 2015), motor skills and social interaction (Bhat et al., 2011),
visual processing and social skills (Hellendoorn et al., 2014),
and joint attention and language development (Murray et al.,
2008).
Severity of Autism
Autism is a spectrum disorder which means that the severity and
nature of symptoms vary greatly among people with autism. Our
hypothesis of a deficit in invariance detection would predict a
continuum and not the development of a discrete disorder. We
assume a direct link between the ability to detect invariants and
the severity of the symptoms.We further assume that the ability to
detect invariant structures will be determined by synaptic pruning
and processes of neural synchrony. Moreover, we expect that the
ability to detect invariance is intact in all people with ASD, at least
at aminimal level of functioning, as we share as human beings this
fundamental learning process with many other animals. Finally,
only a fully intact ability to detect invariances contributes to a
normal development. From a dynamic system perspective and
embedded cognition approach, stressing the coupling between
heterogeneous systems, we assume that even a slightest deviation
in this process may lead to atypical developmental trajectories in
many domains. While some children with ASD, who function
at a very low level of development, may just be able to detect
invariance over little variability, and therefore engage mainly with
static objects, demonstrate repetitive and stereotyped behaviors
and are highly reliant on a predictable and structured environment
in order to function relatively well, other children with ASD may
be able to cope with variability much better, which makes them
able to interact socially. This latter group will be more flexible
in adapting to changing situations and contexts. The severity of
ASD symptoms is also dependent on the presence of a comor-
bid intellectual disability. While implicit learning performance,
such as invariance detection, has been shown to be unrelated to
intelligence quotient (IQ), explicit learning is strongly (positively)
correlated with IQ (Gebauer and Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman
et al., 2010). Therefore, people with ASD with normal or high
intelligence may compensate for their implicit learning deficit by
using explicit learning processes. Studies demonstrate that when
explicit social cognition task are used, ASD and typically develop-
ing (TD) individuals do not differ in social cognition, while they
did differ in implicit social cognition (Callenmark et al., 2014).
In addition, some studies indicate that persons with ASD are able
to achieve equivalent performance on tasks that are focused at
measuring implicit learning, because they are able to solve the
task by using explicit strategies (Ozonoff andMiller, 1995; Klinger
and Dawson, 2001). This may explain part of the heterogeneity
and varying levels of functioning in ASD. People with ASD with
normal intelligence levels may be able to explicitly learn some of
the regularities that they do not perceive automatically, Moreover,
they can be instructed how to act accordingly, but they are not
able to learn the more subtle implicit social rules. Although this
strategy is inflexible and less efficient, it may facilitate the interac-
tion with the environment. Individuals with ASD and intellectual
disability are expected to be impaired in both implicit and explicit
learning.
Relationship with Other Theories
The theory presented in this paper has both similarities to and
differences with other accounts on autism. Our theory differs
from the ToM theory, the executive dysfunction (EF) account
and WCC account of ASD in the sense that our theory pro-
poses a process that locates the construction of meaning in the
person-environment interaction, while the other theories are top-
down oriented cognitivist theories that locate the construction of
meaning internally in the mind of an individual. Our hypothe-
sis of invariant detection has similarities and builds upon other
theories, such as the enhanced perceptual functioning hypoth-
esis of Mottron et al. (2006). The latter account suggests that
locally oriented perception is enhanced in ASD and that this may
explain both social and non-social information processing. Our
proposal is also similar to the account ofGepner and Féron (2009).
They suggest that an impairment in temporo-spatial processing
can explain both social and non-social characteristics of ASD.
While our theory has similarities to these accounts of ASD, the
theory of invariance detection moves beyond a description of a
general deficit by suggesting a specific learning mechanism. Our
hypothesis is also related to the theory proposed by Pellicano
and Burr (2012) who suggest that attenuated Bayesian priors may
be responsible for the unique perceptual experience of autistic
people. This means that the perception is less modulated by
prior experience in ASD. While our theory is related to this
hypothesis, Pellicano and Burr (2012) focus on weak priors as the
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central mechanism, while we propose that invariance detection
is the process that is altered in ASD. In contrast to Pellicano
and Burr (2012), we do not suggest that people with ASD have
weak priors, but different priors. Because of their invariance detec-
tion impairments, we hypothesize that the priors of people with
ASD also include variant aspects of the environment and are
more exemplar-based instead of prototype-based (Dovgopoly and
Mercado, 2013; Church et al., 2015). Temple Grandin said in an
interview in 2010: “My brain is like Google Images. If someone
says the word factory, most people think of a vague place. I think
in detail of every factory I ever saw1.” We suggest that the priors
of people with ASD are less based on the stable regularities in the
environment and are therefore also less useful in predicting the
environment. While Pellicano and Burr (2012) mainly focus on
describing the relevance of their theory in relation to sensory and
perceptual features of ASD (Pellicano, 2013), we have attempted to
explain the relevance of our hypothesis for several developmental
domains.
“Fractionable Triad” vs. Invariance
Detection Deficit?
Our hypothesis of invariance detection, a universal deficit that
may explain the different characteristics of ASD, seems to be
hard to reconcile with the proposal of the “fractionable” autism
triad in which it was claimed that, ASD is not a coherent syn-
drome (Happé and Ronald, 2008). Instead, it is hypothesized
that the social-communicative impairments and the restricted
and repetitive behavior and interests can be separated and have
distinct causes (Happé and Ronald, 2008). This hypothesis is
supported by studies that demonstrate that a two-factor solution,
not a one factor solution adequately fits the data (Snow et al.,
2009; Frazier et al., 2012, 2014) and by studies that suggest that
the inherited influences on the domains of ASD are indepen-
dent of one another (Ronald et al., 2006a,b). However, although
some studies find a two-factors solution, Frazier et al. (2014)
demonstrate that the two factors are strongly related. Strong inter-
correlations between traits would be expected from a universal
deficit model, while it could also be the case that these relations
are the result of developmental cascades (Brundson and Happé,
2014). The findings that the two core ASD features are separable
should not immediately be taken as evidence that the features
cannot result from the same underlying cause. It could be the
case that due to the use of compensatory processes, such as the
use of explicit strategies, that may influence one domain more
than the other, social-communicative impairments and restricted
repetitive behaviors become fractionated, despite the fact that they
are both caused by a deficit in invariance detection (Brundson
and Happé, 2014; Williams and Bowler, 2014). Moreover, other
factors, such as environment, intervention and age, also influence
the severity of symptoms in every domain (Frazier et al., 2012;
Brundson and Happé, 2014) and if these factors differentially
affect the different domains, theymay also lead to results that sug-
gest a fractionation of these symptoms, despite having the same
1http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35150832/ns/health-mental_health/#.VOpW-
UHyG91Z
underlying mechanism. In addition, it is important to take into
account methodological considerations. It may be the case that
the social-communicative impairments and repetitive restricted
behaviors are related, while no relationships are demonstrated in
studies, because the tasks used to investigate the two traits do
not represent the symptoms well, for example when a ToM task
is not related to social skills in daily life (Brundson and Happé,
2014). All in all, while some studies find that the two traits of ASD
can be separated, this does not rule out the possibility that ASD
represents a coherent syndrome with a underlying deficit that is
related to different symptoms, such as an invariance detection
deficit.
Invariance Detection in Other
Developmental Disorders
An important question is whether a deficit in invariance detection
is specific for ASD, i.e., how common a deficit in invariance
detection is among other developmental disorders and how it
relates to intellectual disability. As mentioned before, implicit
learning performance has been shown to be relatively indepen-
dent of IQ level, while explicit learning is strongly correlated
with IQ (Gebauer and Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2010).
Studies demonstrate that implicit learning performance is typical
in children and adults with intellectual disability, while they do
more poorly on explicit learning tasks (Atwell et al., 2003; Vinter
and Detable, 2008). Therefore, we hypothesize that the impair-
ments in invariance detection in individuals with ASD are not
the result of a general intellectual disability. While there are simi-
larities between ASD and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), and between ASD and specific language impairment
(SLI) it is unclear whether these disorders represent a common
etiology. The question is whether a deficit in invariance detec-
tion may also underlie impairments present in ADHD or SLI or
whether it is specific to ASD. Some studies suggest that a domain-
general process of implicit learning is impaired in SLI, which
can present itself also in non-linguistic domains (Ullman and
Pierpont, 2005; Evans et al., 2009; Hsu and Bishop, 2011; Lukács
and Kemény, 2014; Lum et al., 2014). This idea is supported by
research that indicates that SLI is also associatedwith impairments
in several non-linguistic functions, such as motor coordination
(Hill, 2001; Zelaznik and Goffman, 2010), visuospatial processing
(Akshoomoff et al., 2006; Vugs et al., 2013), and with social
impairments that are also typical of ASD (Leyfer et al., 2008).
These findings suggest that it is possible that impairments in ASD
and SLI are both related to a deficit in invariant detection and
that ASD and SLI are on a continuum. However, we need to be
cautious in drawing this conclusion, since the evidence is very
speculative and because other studies suggest distinct underlying
mechanisms for similar impairments in ASD and SLI (White-
house et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2013). Individuals with ADHD
also show partly similar impairments to the impairments present
in ASD. ADHD is for instance associated with impairments in
social cognition such as emotional face perception (for a review,
see Uekermann et al., 2010) and motor coordination difficulties
(Fliers et al., 2008). While some studies indicate that individuals
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with ADHD display impairments in implicit learning (Huang-
Pollock et al., 2014), which could be an explanation for the deficits
in several developmental domains, most theoretical models and
empirical studies suggest that implicit learning is not the most
probable underlying mechanism of the impairments in ADHD.
Rather, the impairments in attention and inhibition present in
ADHD are a more plausible explanation. These impairments
have found to be related to impairments in a range of develop-
mental domains, such as social deficits (Sinzig et al., 2008) and
motor coordination difficulties in ADHD (Fliers et al., 2008).
Some studies suggest overlap between ASD, SLI and ADHD
both at the phenotypic and the aetiological level, other stud-
ies however, indicate that different underlying mechanisms can
lead to similar behavioral profiles. Examinations of similarities
and differences in invariance detection between developmental
disorders and the relationships of perceptual learning with devel-
opment in different domains in these groups are needed to answer
the question whether an invariance detection deficit is specific
for ASD.
Research Implications: Testing the Theory
The current theory predicts that individuals with ASD have spe-
cific difficulties with the perceptual learning process of detecting
invariance over change compared to age and IQmatched controls.
In contrast to other theories, our theory suggests a problem in
a domain-general learning process instead of suggesting a static
impairment. Tasks that are suitable to test our hypothesis are
for instance category learning tasks that involves training indi-
viduals to classify abstract unfamiliar (novel) shapes or patterns
of dots into categories (Dovgopoly and Mercado, 2013). It is
best to use non-social tasks to exclude the explanation that the
difficulties in performing this task in ASD can be attributed to
social deficits, such as a lack of ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Moreover, the invariant patterns in this task should consist of
interchange between configural/global and local characteristics.
We expect that individuals with ASD have difficulties in detecting
the invariant patterns over change regardless of the nature (global
or local) of the information. This excludes the possibility that
the impairments can be attributed to deficit in WCC (Frith and
Happé, 1994; Happé and Frith, 2006) or enhanced perceptual
functioning (Mottron et al., 2006). In addition, by using unfa-
miliar novel shapes it is less plausible that the impairments in
perceptual learning can be attributed to weak priors as suggested
by Pellicano and Burr (2012). It is expected that performance
on this task will be influence by length of exposure, length of
training, and complexity in terms of the amount of variant prop-
erties. Individuals with ASD are expected to need more exposure
and training in order to detect invariants, and they might be
unable to do so in the most complex conditions. In addition,
it is expected that performance on perceptual learning tasks is
related to skills in different developmental domains. Longitudinal
research is needed to examine whether individual differences in
the ability to detect invariance may be related to the develop-
ment of autistic behaviors, both talents and impairments, and
whether these differences can attributed to differences in neural
plasticity.
Practical Implications
Since invariance detection is assumed to be a fundamental learn-
ing process that is already present at birth, a deficit in this learning
process that can be detected with well-designed experimental
research designs may provide opportunities for the early screen-
ing and detection of ASD. If our hypothesis is correct, than it
is likely that individuals with ASD will benefit greatly if infor-
mation is provided in an invariant, structured and predictable
way. Robots might be able to provide such an environment (e.g.,
Srinivasan and Bhat, 2013). Parents and professionals may also
address this need by adapting the physical environment and
adjusting their behaviors and communication toward children
and adults with ASD in a manner that limits variance. The pro-
posed hypothesis of a deficit in invariance detection is in line
with several studies that confirmed the utility of structuring as
an intervention approach for children with ASD. The Treatment
and Education of Autistic and Communication Handicapped
Children (TEACCH; Mesibov et al., 2004) program emphasizes
structure and has come to be called “structured teaching.” Impor-
tant elements of structured teaching include organization of the
physical environment, predictable sequence of activities, visual
schedules and structured work/activity systems. Studies support
the effectiveness of the TEACCH program (Ozonoff and Cath-
cart, 1998; Panerai et al., 2002). Since most individuals with
ASD with normal or high intelligence are able to learn and use
explicit strategies, while having difficulties with implicit learn-
ing, this strength can be used to help people with ASD in their
daily functioning. This may, to a certain extent, compensate for
deficits in invariance detection. For example, the interventions
with social stories make implicit regularities in social interaction,
explicit.
Possibilities for intervention at the neurobiological level have
also been suggested. Since neural mechanisms of synchronization
and connectivity may play a role in invariant detection, deep
brain stimulation (DBS) or transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) might be applied in order to reorganize cortical activ-
ity. TMS uses low-powered magnetic fields to alter the firing
of neurons in one part of the brain, and can be tuned to a
specific brain region and to either increase or decrease activity.
Studies have shown that low-frequency TMS minimized corti-
cal responses to irrelevant stimuli and increased responses to
relevant stimuli in ASD (Sokhadze et al., 2010) and that DBS
might be helpful in treating disorders that are co-morbid with
ASD, such as Obsessive-compulsive disorder (de Haan et al.,
2013).
Conclusion
In this article, we theorized that individuals with ASD are born
with a deficit in invariance detection, which prevents them from
perceiving and experiencing order in a constantly changing envi-
ronment. In our view, the present work expands upon other ASD
theories by suggesting a specific learning process from which to
understand the emergence of ASD symptomatology. Our the-
ory also adds to traditional theories by taking into account that
cognition cannot be separated from perception and action and
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emerges in the person-environment system during interaction.
The theory presented in this paper needs further quantifica-
tion. Researchers should attempt to integrate neurobiological and
behavioral research results. Much work is needed to specify the
role of invariant detection for the developmental trajectories of
individuals with ASD from birth onward.
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